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THE CHEROKEE CASES: THE FIGHT TO SAVE THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE CHEROKEE INDIANS
Ronald A. Berutti*
Introduction
The United States Supreme Court cases Cherokee Nation v. Georgia1
and Worcester v. Georgia2 (the Cherokee cases) were the culmination
of a longstanding political dispute over the rights of American Indians
in the face of the expansionist policies of the United States. Both
Cherokee Nation and Worcester were argued during the administration
of avowed "state's rights" supporter President Andrew Jackson, who
had no sympathy for the Indian cause. Embroiled in political intrigue,
the Cherokee cases can be seen as the historical low point of the
Supreme Court. However, the ultimate result of the Cherokee cases
was to greatly enhance the protections afforded American Indians.
Two quotes - one real, one allegedly real - highlight the dynamics
of these cases which pitted Chief Justice John Marshall, an ardent
Federalist, against President Jackson. The first quote, taken from
Chief Justice Marshall's obituary,3 reads:
John Marshall, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States, died at Philadelphia on the 6th day of
July, 1835 ...
His private virtues as a man, and his public services as a
patriot, are deeply inscribed in the hearts of his fellow
citizens.
His extensive legal attainments, and profound, discrimi-
nating judicial talents, are universally acknowledged.
His judgments upon great and important constitutional
questions affecting the safety, the tranquility and the per-
manency of the government of his beloved country - his
decisions on international and general law, distinguished by
their learning, integrity and accuracy, are recorded in the
reports of the cases adjudged in the Supreme Court of the
United States, in which he presided during a period of
thirty-four years.
© 1992 Ronald A. Berutti
* J.D., 1992, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 1988, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst. This note is dedicated to my parents and to Keva Treacy.
Second place winner, 1990-91 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition.
1. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
2. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
3. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) v (1835) (obituary of Marshall, C.J.).
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As long as the c6nstitution and laws shall endure and
have authority, these will be respected, regarded and main-
tained.
4
The second quote is attributed to President Jackson just three years
earlier. Upon learning of the Worcester decision in 1832, President
Jackson allegedly said, "John Marshall has made his decision; now
let him enforce it."s Whether this quote is real or imagined, Jackson's
refusal to execute the Worcester mandate could have rendered the
Court impotent. Should a President fail to execute a Supreme Court
decree because of his ideological opposition to it, he would effectively
be vetoing the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution and
replacing it with his own interpretation. Such precedent could poten-
tially destroy the Supreme Court's role as a functional branch of
government, and its opinions could be rendered meaningless on a
presidential whim. This was the scenario of the Cherokee cases.
How is it that Chief Justice Marshall was so highly praised only
three years after President Jackson refused to execute Worcester? How
did the Supreme Court survive President Jackson's failure to execute
the law, as was his constitutional duty?6 The answers to these questions
are the result of many contributing factors. In order to understand
those factors as well as the Cherokee cases themselves, an overview
of the United States' Indian policy is necessary.
I. United States Policy Toward the Indians
A. Removal
Following the Revolution, the United States expanded as its popu-
lation increased and American cotton became the nation's major crop.
Since it ravaged the soil, cotton perpetually required new land upon
which to be grown. The Indians, who possessed thousands of miles
of land east of the Mississippi River, became an obstacle for those
who needed or wanted that land.7 To many, "removal" was the answer
to this problem.
Removal basically entailed moving the Indian tribes west of the
Mississippi River. Displacing the Indians would enable white Americans
4. Id.
5. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE IM.IA.L PRESMENCY 37.40, 56-57, 157-58
(1973).
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 reads in pertinent part, "[The President] shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed."
7. See generally Robert A. Williams, Documents of Barbarism: The Contemporary
Legacy of European Racism and Colonialism in the Narrative Traditions of Federal
Indian Law, 31 Aiz. L. REv. 237, 243 (1989).
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to have plenty of farmland. As early as 1789, it was argued (in a
report to Congress by Henry Knox, President George Washington's
Secretary of War) that Removal would be America's wisest policy in
dealing with the Indians.8 Others- of the day concurred. Benjamin
Lincoln, an American statesman and Revolutionary War general, wrote
that "civilized and uncivilized people cannot live in the same territory
or even in the same neighborhood." 9 These discourses in favor of
Removal during the Constitution's formative years cast an ominous
shadow over future Indian relations.
In 1802 the United States government took a large step toward
making Removal a national policy. In what was known as the "Georgia
Compact," Georgia agreed to cede to the national government all of
its western lands which were occupied by Indians. In return, the United
States would extinguish Indian title to these lands as quickly as pos-
sible.'0 Obviously, Removal was the easiest way to accomplish this.
One of President Thomas Jefferson's primary purposes for making
the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 was to effectuate this policy." In a
letter written to Louisiana Governor William Henry Harrison, Jeffer-
son wrote, "Our settlements will gradually circumscribe and approach
the Indians, and [the Indians] will in time either incorporate with us
as citizens of the United States, or remove beyond the Mississippi.'
2
He noted further that "our strength and their weakness is now so
visible that they must see we have only to shut our hand to crush
them and that all our liberties to them proceed from motives of pure
humanity only."'" Jefferson's bloodcurdling passages characterized the
views held by many Americans of the Indians. Andrew Jackson clearly
fit within this category of Americans, as his own Indian policies
displayed.
With the Louisiana Purchase, it became clear that the United States
would vigorously pursue the policy of removing the red man from his
tribal homeland. This would allow the white man to claim the land
so that the black man could work it for him. With the whites sur-
rounding them on all sides, it became very easy to assert this suprem-
acist policy against the less-mighty Indians.
8. Id. at 254.
9. Roy H. PrancE, SAVAoiSM & CriVEZATioN: A STUDY OF THE INDIAN Am D TmE
AimmcAi MIND 68 (Johns Hopkins Paperbacks ed. 2d prtg. 1971).
10. Jessie D. Green & Susan Work, Comment, Inherent Indian Sovereignty, 4 Am.
INDIAN L. REv. 311, 321 (1976).
11. Id.
12. Letter from President Jefferson to William Henry Harrison (Feb. 27, 1803), in
Documents of United States Indian Policy 22 (Francis P. Prucha ed., 1975).
13. Id.
No. 1]
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B. The Treaty Period
An alternative to Removal was to make treaties which would create
a peaceful coexistence between the Americans and the Indians. This
was the initial approach taken by the United States. Although destined
for failure, the legacy left by these treaties was important to the
outcome of the Cherokee cases, which in turn had a critical effect
upon Indian rights as a whole.
In 1783, after the powers of Europe had largely been dislodged from
the eastern portion of America, the Americans became aggressively
expansive.' 4 The various Indian tribes, including the Cherokees, initially
attempted to dismantle the new white settlements by force. However,
this :policy resulted in the virtual elimination of several previously
populous tribes, transforming them into mere bands of Indians which
were easy prey for the federal government's demands.1
5
Perceptive southern tribes tried an alternative response to American
aggression. The Cherokees, Creeks, Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Sem-
inoles - who collectively became known as the "Five Civilized Tribes"
- began a strategy of "passive defense."' 6 Attempting to save their
tribal homelands, they strengthened their internal institutions in order
to more effectively deal with the United States. The tribes invited
missionaries into their territories, centralized their governments, and
supported literacy programs in order to have better-informed tribes-
men. 7 At this time, a Cherokee named Sequoyah created a written
alphabet for the Cherokee language, which soon led to the publishing
of the Cherokee Phoenix, the first American Indian newspaper. 8
Moreover, the governments of the Five Civilized Tribes began to
develop "organic laws" emulating those of the Anglo-Americans. In
conjunction with this, these tribes began making treaties with the
United States government.19
In 1785 the Treaty of Hopewell" became the first treaty made
between the Cherokees and the United States. Declaring that "the
hatchet shall be forever buried,' ' 2 this treaty set boundaries between
the two nations and withdrew United States protection of settlers not
complying with the treaty. Finally, this treaty gave Congress the sole
14. Arrell M. Gibson, Constitutional Experiences of the Five Civilized Tribes, 2
Am. INrL~u L. REv. 17, 20 (1974).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 21.
18. Id. at 21-22.
19. Id. at 22.
20. Treaty of Hopewell, Nov. 28, 1785, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 18.
21. Id. at 20.
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power to manage the trade of the Indians as a way for the Cherokees
to be received "into the favor and protection" of the United States.2
This part of the treaty was to cause the Indians much difficulty in the
future.
Like those which were to follow, the Treaty of Hopewell was
immediately doomed to failure. Believing that its interests were not
represented by the treaty, North Carolina refused to recognize it. Since
the state had yet to ratify the Constitution, political expedience required
that President Washington not enforce the treaty against North Car-
olina until it had done so. By then, there were too many white settlers
within Cherokee territory to effectively enforce the treaty, and a new
treaty had to be negotiated.?
The resulting 1791 Treaty of Holston24 moved the boundary west-
ward, to protect the illegal settlers. This treaty further "solemnly
guarantee[d] to the Cherokee nation, all their lands not hereby ceded."
'2
Apparently, the federal government's intent was genuine. As incursions
by settlers continued, Congress passed an act supporting the boundary
line created by the Treaty of Holston.26 However, this sincerity once
again gave way to political expedience when Tennessee began bitterly
complaining about both the congressional act and the Treaty of Hol-
ston.2 7 As a result, President John Adams proposed to again renego-
tiate the boundaries with the Cherokees, 2 resulting in the Treaty of
Tellico, 29 which for a consideration of $25,000 again moved the United
States-Cherokee Nation border further west.
Because the young federal government's relationship with the various
states was characterized by friction, it is no wonder that the Indians
were so poorly treated. Any time the federal government acted in a
manner which mildly harmed the states and which could be viewed as
pro-Indian, the threat arose of secession, civil war, or both. The
Indians were, therefore, victimized by the tension created by federal-
ism. The Louisiana Purchase gave the federal government a perfect
opportunity to abrogate this tension. It appeased the states by taking
Indian land while seemingly not causing the Indians harm as they were
given new lands west of the Mississippi River. This moralistic, Union-
saving approach to dealing with the Indians led to the merging of
22. Ben 0. Bridgers, An Historical Analysis of the Legal Status of the North
Carolina Cherokees, 58 N.C. L. REv. 1075, 1077 (1980).
23. Id. at 1077-78.
24. Treaty of Holston, July 2, 1791, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 39.
25. Bridgers, supra note 22, at 1078.
26. Intercourse Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, § 1, 1 Stat. 469.
27. Bridgers, supra note 22, at 1078-79.
28. Id. at 1079.
29. Treaty of Tellico, Oct. 2, 1798, U.S.-Cherokee Indians, 7 Stat. 62.
No. 1]
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trealy-making and Removal policies. Of course, the Indians were never
seriously consulted on these matters.
In 1804 and 1805, three separate treaties were negotiated with the
Cherokees.", The United, States purchased large tracts of Cherokee
land in Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Alabama. In an act typi-
fying American greed, one of these treaties, which called for a purchase
price of $2006), was secretly renegotiated for a price of $1000 and two
rifles for Cherokee chiefs." A period of quiet followed enactment of
these treaties, due to the War of 1812.
The United States once again became concerned with the Indians in
1816 when two treaties were negotiated .on the same day.3 2 One of
these ceded all Cherokee lands within South Carolina to the United
States. The second allowed for unrestricted road privileges through
Cherokee territory. As 'a result of these treaties, a large band of
Cherokees moved west of the Mississippi and formed the Western
Cherokee tribe. Needing land, the *Cherokees traded large portions of
their Georgia and Tennessee lands to the United States.33 Shortly
thereafter, the Cherokees declared- that they would no longer sell land
to the United States. This has .been considered "[tihe doom of the
Cherokees.,,3
4
"II. The Jacksonian Period
A. Background
Although elected President in 1828, events in 1827 were largely
responsible for Andrew Jackson's position on the Cherokee cases.
Following these events were a curious mix of political intrigue and
court battles, among them the Cherokee cases.
In 1827 gold was discovered on the Georgia-based Cherokee and
Creek lands. Georgia Governor George C. Gilmer ordered a survey of
this land and called out the state militia to protect surveyors. Moreover,
he threatened civil war should the federal government intercede. Al-
30. Treaty for Cession of Land in Georgia, Oct. 24, 1804, U.S.-Cherokee Indians,
7 Stat. 228; Treaty for Cession of Land and Road Privileges, Oct. 25, 1805, U.S.-
Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 93; Treaty of Cession of Land and Road Privileges, Oct. 27,
1805, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 95.
31. Bridgers, supra note 22, at 1079-80.
32. Treaty for Cession of Land in South Carolina, Mar. 22, 1816, U.S.-Cherokee
Nation, 7 Stat. 138; Convention to Settle Boundary Lines, Mar. 22, 1816, U.S.-Cherokee
Nation, 7 Stat. 139.
33. Treaty for Cession of Land in Georgia and Tennessee, July 8, 1817, U.S.-
Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 156.




though President John Quincy Adams did threaten to send troops, the
Creeks capitulated and moved west. Military conflict was thereby
prevented. 5
The Cherokees responded to Georgia's actions by adopting a written
constitution. They proclaimed themselves an independent state outside
of the jurisdiction of either the federal government or the several
states.3" The Cherokee constitution was largely patterned after that of
the United States, creating a republican government with the Cherokee
Nation divided into several districts.17 This proved to be short-lived,
however, as the Georgia legislature attempted to destroy Cherokee
sovereignty by effecting its own laws within Cherokee territory and
declaring those of the Cherokees to be null and void." Cherokee land
was sold at public lottery, and several of the existing counties of the
state were apportioned land that was formerly Cherokee territory.39
By this time, Andrew Jackson had been elected President with heavy
support from the South, and, as a result, threat of military action by
the federal government was no longer forthcoming.
B. Motives Behind Jackson's Indian Policy
Andrew Jackson's Cherokee policy resulted not only from his up-
bringing in the notoriously anti-Cherokee state of Tennessee, but also
from three major political squabbles of the day. Besides the Georgia-
Cherokee dispute, Jackson was trying to push a protective tariff*
through Congress. He challenged the rechartering of the Second Bank
of the United States, and sat idly by while Congress tried to strip the
Supreme Court of its powers of review. These policies were all to
become intimately tied to the Cherokee cases.4
First, Jackson sought a protective tariff, which would effectively
hurt the interests of some southern states. South Carolina was the
most bitterly opposed to this tariff and sought to nullify it within its
borders. Although normally a states' rights supporter, Jackson opposed
South Carolina's nullification attempt because it conflicted with his
policy objectives.
Being a natural ally to South Carolina in the nullification battle,
Georgia was wooed by President Jackson on the Indian issue in order
35. Clifford M. Lytle, The Supreme Court, Tribal Sovereignty, and Continuing
Problems of State Encroachment into Indian Country, 8 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 65, 67
(1980).
36. Id.
37. Bridgers, supra note 22, at 1082.
38. Id.; Lytle, supra note 35, at 67.
39. Bridgers, supra note 22, at 1082; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
525-26 (1832).
40. See generally William F. Swindler, Politics as Law: The Cherokee Cases, 3 Am.
INDIAN L. REv. 7, 8 (1975).
No. 1]
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to keep it from joining South Carolina's nullification forces. First,
Jackson appointed Georgia Senator John N. Berrien, a known advocate
of Removal, as his attorney general. 4' Jackson also made it very clear
that he would not stand between Georgia and its actions regarding
Cherokee lands. In an 1829 address to Congress, Jackson said:
[S]urrounded by the whites, with their arts of civilization,
which by destroying the resources of the savage, doom him
to weakness and decay, the fate of the Mohegan, the Nar-
ragansett, and the Delaware, is fast overtaking the Choctaw,
the Cherokee and the Creek. That this fate surely awaits
them if they remain within the limits of the states does not
admit of a doubt. Humanity and national honor demand
that every effort should be made to avert so great a calam-
ity.42
This "natural law" theory that pitted civilized white society against
non-Christian "savages" was a familiar theme of Removal politics
43
and was a clear indication to Georgia that President Jackson would
not stand in its way as President John Quincy Adams had almost
done.
Meanwhile, a Georgia-inspired bill was making its way through the
House of Representatives. The bill, which had been approved by the
House Judiciary Committee, called for amendments to the Judiciary
Act of 1789." The focus of this bill was to deny the Supreme Court
jurisdiction over state court rulings.
45
Finally, Jackson was embroiled in a political dispute with Congress
over the rechartering of the Second Bank of the United States. Jackson
was rabidly opposed to the bank, and was not fond of its stockholders.
Along with the tariff, Jackson's desire to see the demise of the bank
was a central goal of his presidency.
Against the backdrop of this series of events, the challenge to
Georgia's laws within Cherokee territory was heard by the Supreme
Court in Cherokee Nation. It was a "no-win" situation for the Cher-
okees. The Court could not rule in favor of them because Jackson
41. Id.
42. Williams, supra note 7, at 246 (quoting Andrew Jackson, Message of the
President to Both Houses of Congress (Dec. 8, 1829), in 6 CONo DEB. app. 15 (1829)).
43. See Williams, supra note 7, at 246. But see Dario F. Robertson, Note, A New
Constitutional Approach to the Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty, 6 AM. INDuAN L. REV.
371, 376-79 (discussing a natural law theory dating back to the year 1532 which gave
the American Indians a natural right of self-government).
44. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73; see also H. REP. No. 43, 21st Cong.,
2d Sess. (1831).
45. Swindler, supra note 40, at 8.
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would have ignored its ruling in order to keep Georgia happy. Further,
a ruling in favor of the Cherokees would have given Congress the
added impetus to destroy the Court's power to hear cases arising in
the states. Without the power to review, the federal government would
be rendered powerless in the face of state incursions on federal law,
thereby making a mockery of the Supremacy Clause. 6 Chief Justice
Marshall was not going to allow his life's work to be destroyed so
easily.
IL The Cherokee Cases
A. The Tassel Case
In 1830, George Tassel, a Cherokee Indian, was arrested for com-
mitting murder within Cherokee territory. 47 The state convicted Tassel
under Georgia law although the matter should have fallen under
Cherokee law per the treaties with the United States. However, the
state's claim that it had jurisdiction over Cherokee lands within its
boundaries was upheld by the Georgia Supreme Court .4 The Cherokees
sought President Jackson's assistance in upholding their treaty rights.
Jackson, however, refused to help.49 Tassel then sought a writ of error
from the United States Supreme Court. When Georgia Governor Gil-
mer received the Court's writ, he referred it to the state legislature,
which resolved to disregard any federal process. 0 Tassel was then
executed.'
In response to the Tassel case, the Cherokee Nation petitioned the
United States Supreme Court to invoke its powers of original juris-
diction,52 asking that an injunction be granted preventing Georgia from
effecting its laws within Cherokee territory. The Cherokees claimed
that Georgia's legislative acts directly violated the Constitution of the
46. U.S. CONST. art. VI, which provides in pertinent part:
This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land;
and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the
constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.
47. Lytle, supra note 35, at 67.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Swindler, supra note 40, at 9.
51. Id.
52. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, which provides in pertinent part, "[the] judicial
power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the
laws of the United States, and treaties made ... between a state, or the citizens thereof,
and foreign states, citizens or subjects."
No. 1]
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United States as well as the various treaties between the United States
and the Cherokee Nation.
5 3
B. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
Less than a month after the Supreme Court issued its subpoena to
Governor Gilmer to appear in Cherokee Nation, a judiciary bill seeking
to diminish the Court's jurisdiction was circulating in the House of
Representatives.5 4 It appeared that a determination in favor of the
Cherokee Nation would surely result in the passage of this bill. Justice
Story wrote that limiting its jurisdiction "would deprive the Supreme
Court of the power to revise the decisions in the state courts and state
legislatures, in all cases in which they were repugnant to the Consti-
tution of the United States." 5 As such it would "tread down the
power on which [the government's] very existence depends."
'5 6
The Cherokees' choice of chief counsel, former Attorney General
Williamn Wirt, 57 can best be described as suicidal to their case. One
reason was that because Wirt was a stockholder in the Second Bank
of the United States, he was an enemy of President Jackson." Such
an added incentive for Jackson to ignore a Supreme Court decision
in favor of the Cherokees was hardly needed. Also hired to represent
the Cherokees was John Sergeant, a prominent Philadelphia attorney 9
Wirt immediately went to work using the highly questionable practice
of tr3ing to solicit information regarding the case from Chief Justice
Marshall. Wirt wanted to know whether it was worth bringing the
case before the Supreme Court 0 The Chief Justice, in a reply through
a mutual friend, wrote that he "wished, most sincerely, that both the
execuive and legislative departments had thought differently on the
subject .... Humanity must bewail the course which is pursued,
whatever may be the decision of policy." 16 ' Clearly the Justices were
aware that their backs were to the wall on this question.
In a very short opinion which smacks of political contrivance and
in which he was joined by only one Associate Justice, Chief Justice
53. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 14 (1831).
54. Swindler, supra note 40, at 9-10.
55. Letter from Joseph Story to George Tickner (Jan. 22, 1831), in 2 LIFE AND
LErrERS OF JOSEPH STORY 45, 48 (William W. Story ed., 1881).
56. Id.
57. Swindler, supra note 40, at 9.
58. Id. at 8.
59. Id. at 12.
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting Letter from William Wirt to Dabney Carr (June 21, 1830), in 2
MEMOIw OF THE LuE OF WaLLum WntT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
296-97 (John P. Kennedy, ed. 1849)).
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Marshall never reached the question of whether Georgia had violated
either the Constitution or the treaties of the United States. Rather,
Marshall presented the question as, "Do the Cherokees constitute a
foreign state in the sense of the Constitution? ' 62 If not, then the Court
would have no jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution.6
In concocting his theory, Marshall wrote that
[I]t may well be doubted whether those tribes which reside
within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States
can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations.
They may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated do-
mestic dependent nations .... Their relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian."
Marshall went on to assert that it was not within the framers' intent
that the Indian tribes be included "when they opened the courts of
the Union to controversies between a State or the citizens thereof, and
foreign states. '"61 Chief Justice Marshall further contended that
[a]t the time the constitution was framed, the idea of ap-
pealing to an American court of justice for an assertion of
right or a redress of wrong, had perhaps never entered the
mind of an Indian or of his tribe. Their appeal was to the
tomahawk, or to the government. This was well understood
by the statesmen who framed the constitution of the United
States, and might furnish some reason for omitting to enu-
merate them among the parties who might sue in the Courts
of the union.6
Marshall then looked to Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution for
further guidance. 67 Based on this, he determined that Indians
are as clearly contradistinguished by a name appropriate to
themselves from foreign nations, as from the several states
composing the union....
... Had the Indian tribes been foreign nations, in the
view of the convention, this exclusive power of regulating
intercourse with them might have been, specifically given in
62. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
63. See supra note 52.
64. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
65. Id. at 18.
66. Id.
67. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides in pertinent part, "Congress shall have
[the] power . . . [tlo regulate commerce with foreign nations, and amongst the several
states, and with the Indian tribes."
No. 1)
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language indicating that idea, not in language contradistin-
guishing them from foreign nations.
68
This, Marshall determined, sufficiently proved that Indian tribes, or
nations within the United States, could not be considered foreign states.
Hence, the Supreme Court could not invoke its power of original
jurisdiction. 9
The Chief Justice concluded his opinion with a chilling paragraph
which signaled the low point of the Marshall Court, if not the Supreme
Court:
If it be true that the Cherokee nation have rights, this is
not the tribunal in which those rights are to be asserted. If
it be true that wrongs have been inflicted, and that still
greater are to be apprehended, this is not the tribunal which
can redress the past or prevent the future.
70
Although he had found a constitutional basis for his assertion, this
was clearly not the precedent which Marshall wanted to set. He
effectively traded away the rights of American Indians in exchange for
retention of the Supreme Court's power. Yet what power did the Court
really have if politics prevented it from making a principled decision?
This might be the question Chief Justice Marshall asked himself when
deciding Worcester the next year.
Two windy concurring opinions in Cherokee Nation rejected the
claim that the Indian nations had any characteristics of sovereignty,
and were, therefore, subject to the whims of the states. 71 Justice
Johnson, ignoring the fact that the Five Civilized Tribes had been
actively adopting organic laws for years, wrote:
I think it very clear that the Constitution neither speaks of
them as States or foreign states, but as just what they were
- Indian tribes - an anomaly known to the books that
treat of States, and which the law of nations would regard
as nothing more than wandering hordes, held together only
by ties of blood and habit, and having neither laws or
governments beyond what is required in a savage state. 2
Finally, the two dissenting Justices, who had to be convinced to file
a dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Marshall,73 felt that the Cherokees
68. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18-19.
69. Id. at 20.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 20-31 (Johnson, J., concurring); id. at 31-50 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 27-28 (Johnson, J., concurring).
73. Lytle, supra note 35, at 69 ("The critical response to the case was so anti-
Indian that Chief Justice Marshall persuaded Thompson and Story to pen their thoughts




were a competent party to sue in court 74 and that they had made a
sufficient caseY.7 As a result, the dissenters felt an injunction was an
appropriate remedy2
6
In the aftermath of Cherokee Nation, Chief Justice Marshall con-
sidered retiring from the Court. "I cannot be insensible to the gloom
that lours [sic] over us," he wrote.77 Speculating on a possible successor
should Marshall decide to retire, John Quincy Adams wrote that "some
shallow-pated wild cat ... fit for nothing but to tear the Union to
rags and tatters, would be appointed in his place. ' 78 However, Marshall
remained with the Court, and the next term would provide his reversal
of fortune.
C. Worcester v. Georgia
The Cherokees were desperate to save their tribal government and,
thus, were in dire need of a test case the Supreme Court could hear.
They found that case when four missionaries were arrested for being
in Cherokee territory without a permit from the governor of Georgia.
79
All four were convicted and sentenced to hard labor for four years.80
The governor extended them all pardons, but two of the four, SamuelT
Worcester and Elizur Butler, refused to accept them so that the
constitutionality of the Georgia law could be tested.8
Initially, the Georgia trial court had released Worcester, a Vermont
citizen,82 because, as a missionary, he had authority to dispense federal
funds and could therefore technically be considered a federal agent. 83
Moreover, Worcester, as the postriaster of the Cherokee capital of
New Echota, was properly within the territory.84 However, to ensure
that Georgia's law would have effect, President Jackson denied the
missionaries federal agent status. He then fired Worcester as post-
master, thereby leaving him unprotected by the federal government
and putting him in violation of the Georgia law. This cleared the way
74. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 50-69 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 69-77 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 77-80 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
77. Swindler, supra note 40, at 14 (quoting Letter from John Marshall to Joseph
Story (Oct. 12, 1831), in MAs. HIST. Soc. PREC. (2d ser.) XIV)).
78. Swindler, supra note 40, at 14 (quoting diary entry of John Q. Adams (Feb.
13, 1831), reprinted in 8 MEmoiRs oF JomH QUINcY ADAMS 315 (Charles F. Adams ed.
1836)).
79. Lytle, supra note 35, at 70.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 536 (1832).
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for the state court to try the case and ultimately to convict the
defendants.1
6
Cherokee Nation attorneys Wirt and Sergeant also represented
Worcester.87 As in Cherokee Nation, the State of Georgia refused to
appear when served with the writ of error, as the Georgia legislature
resolved to ignore the process. 88 Hiring Wirt seemed once again to be
suicidal. It was 1832, a presidential election year, and one of Jackson's
opponents for the presidency was none other than William Wirt.89
Surely Jackson was not going to execute in Wirt's favor any Supreme
Court mandate which could prove harmful to Jackson's administration.
Unlike Cherokee Nation, the procedural grounds in Worcester were
firm. This was not a case where standing to sue could be questioned.
Rather, the question here concerned Georgia's right to control Indian
affairs under the Constitution and in the face of the numerous treaties
between the United States and the Cherokee Nation.
In writing for the six-Justice majority, Chief Justice Marshall held
Georgia's actions to be unconstitutional.9 The Chief Justice first
determined that the case was properly before the Court.91 He then set
out to prove that the laws of Georgia were repugnant to the Consti-
tution, by launching into a long dissertation on the history of Indian
relations from the discovery of the New World through the present
day. 9
2
Deflecting the notion that the Cherokees abandoned their independ-
ent status in treaties by acknowledging the United States as their
protector, Marshall wrote that "[p]rotection does not imply the de-
.struction of the protected." 93 He described the relationship as one "of
a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful,
not that of individuals abandoning their national character, and sub-
mitting as subjects to the laws of a master."'94 Marshall went on to
note that the very fact treaties were repeatedly made with the Cherokees
was evidence of their right to self-government. 95
[The settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker
power does not surrender its independence - its right of
self-government, by associating with a stronger, and taking
86. Id.
87. Id.
811. Id. at 14-15.
89. Id. at 9.
90. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
91. Id. at 536-42.
92. Id. at 542-61.
93,. Id. at 552.
94. rd. at 555.
95. Id. at 560.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss1/12
NOTES
its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its
safety, may place itself under the protection of one more
powerful, without stripping itself of the right of govern-
ment, and ceasing to be a state.1
Marshall concluded that the Cherokee nation
is a distinct community, occupying its own territory ... in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which
the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the
assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with
the treaties, and with the acts of Congress. The whole
intercourse between the United States and this nation, is,
by our Constitution and laws, vested in the government of
the United States. 97
Although Chief Justice Marshall did not make it perfectly clear to
what extent Indian territory could be regulated by the states or the
federal government,98 what was clear was that the Cherokees had won.
Why the Court decided to find for Worcester is a mystery. President
Jackson was clearly going to ignore the Court's mandate. Perhaps the
conscience of the Justices caused them to reach their result. Also, the
Justices might have foreseen the upcoming tariff nullification battle as
eventually working in their favor, causing Jackson to rethink his
position on the Cherokees. Foreseen or not, this is what eventually
happened.
After they handing down the Worcester opinion, the Court, knowing
that the President would probably not execute the law, did not follow
the normal procedure of preparing a mandate requiring federal mar-
shals to effectuate the decision. 99 As a result, President Jackson was
96. Id. at 560-61.
97. Id. at 561.
98. See William Walters, Review Essay: Preemption, Tribal Sovereignty, and
Worcester v. Georgia, 62 OR. L. REv. 127 (1983) (arguing that there were three possible
bases for the Worcester holding: (1) that the federal treaties preempted state law; (2)
the Constitution gave the federal government exclusive control over Indian affairs; and
(3) the Cherokees were a separate sovereign within which Georgia could not legislate
and with whom the United States could only conduct business through treaties and
agreements. Walters concluded that this third position was that which Marshall intended);
see also Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 590-96 (M'Lean, J., concurring) (querying as to
the point at which a state may regulate within an Indian territory, M'Lean wrote, "[I]f
a tribe of Indians shall become so degraded or reduced in numbers as to lose the power
of self-government, the protection of the local law, of necessity, must be extended over
them."). But see Lytle, supra note 35, at 72 (arguing that M'Lean's view has not been
followed through the years).
99. Swindler, supra note 40, at 16.
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not constitutionally required to act on the decision.' °0 The Court,
therefore, had a constitutional excuse to explain President Jackson's
failure to execute the law. Because it prevented precedent from being
set in which the President could "veto" a Supreme Court decision by
not executing it, this politically adept move by the Court also left
Worcester intact as precedent for future courts to follow during more
docile administrations.
This, however, was of little comfort to the Cherokee Nation, which,
despite winning a verdict, was afforded no relief. Further, state courts,
led by Tennessee in State v. Foreman,0 did not obey the Worcester
holding, allowing their respective state's criminal laws to be extended
over any Indian territory within the state. So the Cherokees were
actually worse off than before the Worcester decision.
D. Turn of Political Events
After Jackson's reelection in 1832, a turn of political events occurred
which completely altered his policy toward the Supreme Court. Led
by Jackson's first-term Vice President John Calhoun, forces in South
Carolina mobilized in an effort to nullify the tariff within that state.
In its Nullification Ordinance, South Carolina did, in fact, declare the
tariff null and void.1°2 President Jackson responded by issuing a Proc-
lamation Against Nullification, which declared that South Carolina's
ordinance amounted to rebellion and treason. 03
One element of the South Carolina ordinance forbade its courts
from complying with any Supreme Court process.104 This, like the
Georgia legislature's refusal to comply with the process in the Cherokee
cases, was designed to prevent the Supreme Court from declaring the
state's act unconstitutional. South Carolina's ordinance went further,
however, by prohibiting any court records from being sent to the
Supreme Court. 0 5
Jackson responded by asking Congress to draft a "force bill," which
made it a criminal violation to carry out South Carolina's ordinance. 16
The force bill eventually passed, and, ironically, gave the Supreme
Court more authority over state cases than it had ever had before.'01
President Jackson also promised that he would enforce any Supreme
lO. Id.
101. 16 Tenn. (8 Yer.) 256 (1835).








Court decision which found unconstitutional a state attempt to override
a legitimate federal government power. 08
Having been reelected, President Jackson no longer felt the need to
court certain factions. The policies which ensued from the squelching
of nullification were now more important than his first-term promises.
Jackson's once vigorous support of Georgia in the Cherokee cases was
no longer necessary, since Jackson no longer feared Georgia's joining
forces with South Carolina against him. Any Georgian who backed
South Carolina's policy of nullification would be breaking the law.
Also, by failing to comply with the Worcester decision during President
Jackson's first term, Georgia now found itself in the uncomfortable
position of being directly opposed to Jackson's second-term Supreme
Court policy. Looking for a way to gracefully escape this predicament,
the Georgia governor extended pardons to Worcester and Butler in
return for a withdrawal of their suit against the state.'09
With the crushing of South Carolina's nullification attempt, Andrew
Jackson had completed almost all of his objectives. Besides installing
the tariff, he had successfully vetoed the rechartering of the Second
Bank of the United States. Further, his handling of the nullification
movement worked to destroy the presidential hopes of South Carolina's
John Calhoun. Thus, Jackson's chosen successor, Martin Van Buren,
was virtually assured of winning the next election. 10 Finally, President
Jackson had successfully used the Supreme Court to further his own
political agenda. The Cherokee cases highlighted this final achievement.
Initially, Jackson saw them as despicable attempts by the Supreme
Court to encroach upon state power. They ended up a shining example
of the President's respect for the integrity of the Supreme Court and
federal powers.
Jackson had one remaining objective. This was to effect the removal
of the Cherokee Indians completely. In what was probably partial
payment to Georgia for pardoning Worcester and Butler, the Jackson
administration forced the Treaty of New Echota" upon the Cherokees
in 1835. Unsigned by any member of the Cherokee Nation, the treaty
ceded the Cherokees' entire eastern territory to the United States for
$5 million." 2 The United States was also to bear the expense of moving
the Cherokees west of the Mississippi.' Unsatisfied with this aspect
of the treaty, Georgia's governor warned that "if trouble came from
108. Id.
109. Id. at 17.
110. Id. at 16-17.
111. Treaty of New Echota, Dec. 29, 1835, U.S.-Cherokee Nation, 7 Stat. 478.
112. Bridgers, supra note 22, at 1083.
113. Id.
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any protection afforded by the government troops to the Cherokee[s],
a direct collision [would occur] between the ... state and [the federal]
government."111 4 However, this fear was unwarranted, because Presi-
dent Jackson was not going to protect the Indians from the state
government. Thus, with Jackson conclusively effecting Removal through
the formality of yet another fraudulent treaty, the Cherokees began
their infamous journey along the Trail of Tears.
Conclusion
Presented with a tremendous burden by President Andrew Jackson,
the Supreme Court fought and survived this political battle for its life.
Although embarrassed by its Cherokee Nation decision, the Court
redeemed itself the next term with the Worcester opinion. Chief Justice
Marshall's shrewd maneuvering following Worcester prevented the
destruction of the Court. The decision also enabled Marshall to live
out his term knowing that the Supreme Court was resting on a solid
foundation. Thus, John Marshall's obituary does, in fact, ring true.
As for the Cherokee cases, they created important rights which
protected Indians from the states. However, the Jackson administra-
tion's Indian policies, which were created through a combination of
past policy and contemporary politics, foreclosed the Cherokee Indians
themselves from enjoying those protections.
114. Id.
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